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DONALD R. SONGER 
IN CONTRAST TO the large and growing literature on Supreme Court 
decision-making in cases decided with full opinions, relatively little 
has been written about the prior court decisions to grant or deny 
review on petitions for certiorari. Such a shortcoming may be due 
in part to the difficulty in obtaining the relevant empirical facts 
about the process of decision-making which the Supreme Court's 
"doctrine of secrecy" produces. 
This lack of attention should not, however, be allowed to obscure 
the obvious policy significance of these decisions. In the past about 
75 percent of all cases that went to oral argument reached the 
Supreme Court through petitions for certiorari.' Certiorari deci- 
sions are thus a crucial part of the gatekeeping processes by which 
the justices determine which issues will be the subjects of Court 
output. 
The justices on the Supreme Court have done little to aid scholars 
who seek to understand the process. Several studies have suggested 
that the official court criteria, contained in Rule 19, shed little light 
1 Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, The Federal Courts as a Political 
System (2nd ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 132. 
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on the subject.2 In addition, the Court frequently gives no reason 
for the denial of certiorari in a particular case and when it does 
purport to offer some explanation, the most frequent reasons given 
relate to the importance of the case. However, the Court rarely 
explains why a given case was considered "important." 
An explanation of decisions on certiorari must begin by noting 
the large number of decisions which must be made in relatively 
short periods of time. One study found that at most each justice 
spends an average of 9.5 minutes per paid petition for certiorari 
and considerably less time on petitions filed in forma pauperis.3 
Such time constraints obviously make detailed consideration of most 
petitions impossible. 
The recognition of the lack of time justices have to study certiorari 
petitions combined with the belief that a substantial number of the 
petitions are frivolous led Joseph Tananhaus and associates to offer 
an explanation of certiorari decision-making based on cue theory. 
They hypothesized that judges used some method of separating 
those petitions which required serious attention from those that 
were frivolous and that a readily identifiable group of cues exists 
to serve this purpose. They suggested that the presence of any 
one of these cues will warn the justice that the petition deserves 
scrutiny, while if no cues are present a justice can safely discard 
the petition without further expenditure of time and energy.4 
They hypothesized that petitions with no cues would be denied 
and those containing one or more cues would be studied carefully 
and between 25 percent and 43 percent of the petitions with cues 
would be granted.5 Three cues were found whose presence sig- 
nificantly increased the chances that a petition would be granted. 
Of the 1,226 petitions with one or more cues present, 27.5 percent 
were granted compared to the rate of 7.1 percent granted for the 
1,372 petitions which contained no cues.6 Tanenhaus, et. al., con- 
2 A succinct summary of past studies which demonstrates the inadequacies 
of Rule 19 may be found in Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Mura- 
skin, and Daniel Rosen, "The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue 
Theory" in Glendon Schubert, ed., Judicial Decision-Making (Glencoe: Free 
Press, 1963), 113-115. 
3 Gerhard Casper and Richard A. Posner, The Workload of the Supreme 
Court (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1967), 65-66. 
4Tanenhaus, et. al., "Cue Theory," 118-120. 
5 Ibid., 121. 
6Ibid., 126. 
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cluded that of the three cues, the most important was the presence 
of the national government as the party seeking review.7 
A subsequent study by S. Sidney Ulmer, et. al., confirmed the re- 
lative importance of the cue of the federal government as party and 
petitioner. In fact, when only cases actually discussed by the 
justices in conferences were used, the party cue was the only one 
of Tanenhaus' three cues which significantly increased the chances 
of certiorari being granted.8 
The main factor which seems to be missing in cue theory as ex- 
plicated by Tanenhaus, et. al., is any attention to the merits or the 
policy significance of the decision below in cases in which petitions 
for certiorari are filled. The belief that the policy values of judges 
influence their decisions in cases decided on the merits and that 
judges are concerned about the policy outputs of their courts is not 
a new idea to students of judicial behavior.9 In fact, as a recent 
textbook on the courts puts it, the "central hunch" of behavioral 
scholars since Pritchett is that, ". . attitudes and values guide 
voting behavior and that the votes in specific cases-what the 
authorities actually do-are more important in revealing their atti- 
tudes and values than are the rationalizations they provide in their 
written opinions."'1O 
Since justices appear to recognize the policy significance of their 
certiorari decisions, it would be reasonable to expect them to take 
the policy consequences of their actions into account when deciding 
whether or not to grant certiorari. Lawrence Baum suggests that 
although judges might pursue policy goals through any of several 
strategies, the most common method is likely to be an "error-cor- 
recting" strategy, That is, policy motivated judges would vote to 
grant certiorari whenever a lower court decision departed signifi- 
cantly from their preferred doctrinal position.1' Data from the 
California Supreme Courts seemed to be consistent with such a 
7Ibid., 127. 
8 S. Sidney Ulmer, William Hintze, Louise Kirklosky, "The Decision to Grant 
or Deny Certiorari: Further Consideration of Cue Theory," Law and Society 
Review, 6 (May, 1972), 640. 
9 The best known example of such an approach is probably Glendon Schu- 
bert, judicial Policy-Making (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1965). 
10 Goldman and Jahnige, Federal Courts, 159-160. 
11 Lawrence Baum, "Policy Goals in Judicial Gatekeeping: A Proximity 
Model of Discretionary Jurisdiction," American Journal of Political Science, 21 
(1977), 14. 
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strategy.'2 Using votes on certiorari in the Supreme Court recorded 
by Justice Burton, Ulmer found a congruence between the votes of 
justices on certiorari and their votes on cases decided on the merits 
which is consistent with Baum's theory of an "error-correcting 
strategy.'3 In a subsequent paper using the same date, Ulmer found 
that two liberal justices were more inclined to vote to grant certi- 
orari when the petitioners had low status while two conservative 
justices were more prone to grant review to high state petitioners.'4 
Glendon Schubert's study of injured worker cases also led him to the 
conclusion that the justices were concerned with the policy conse- 
quences of the decision below when reviewing certiorari petitions. 
He maintained that the most reasonable explanation for his finding 
of a much higher rate of granting petitions from the workers than 
from their employers was the favortism of the Court for the claims 
of one class of litigants.'5 
If the scholars cited above are correct in their belief that judges 
are concerned about the policy consequences of their certiorari de- 
cisions, then cue theory leads to the expectation that the judges will 
search for some readily available cues which will enable them 
quickly to evaluate certiorari petitions from a policy perspective. 
To be adequate as such a cue the factor relied on must enable a 
judge to make a quick tentative judgment about whether the case 
below was decided "correctly" (that is, in conformity with the 
judge's own policy preferences) or whether the decision was in 
"error." If this cue indicated to the judge that the decision below. 
was in error, it could be taken as an indicator that the petition de- 
served more careful scrutiny, while if the cue indicated that the 
decision below was correct from his policy perspective and if no 
other cues were present, then the justice could safely discard the 
petition without further expenditure of time and energy. 
For many cases, judges could make such tentative judgments 
about the "correctness" of the decision below by simply following 
the strategy used by many scholars to code decisions as "liberal" or 
12 Ibid., 23-29. 
13 S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Decision to Grant Certiorari as an Indicator to 
Decision 'On the Merits'," Polity, 4 (summer 1972), 429-447. 
14 S. Sidney Ulmer, "Underdogs and Upperdogs: Litigant Status as a 
Factor in the Selection of Cases for Supreme Court Review" (paper presented 
at the 1976 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, 
Georgia, November 4-6, 1976), 18-21. 
15 Glendon Schubert, "Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari 
Game," Stanford Law Review, 14 (1962), 292. 
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"conservative" in their research on judicial behavior. Such a coding 
technique usually relies on the nature of the winning and losing 
party in the case. The experience of the present author is that for 
many cases the decision can be classified as being either liberal or 
conservative with an examination of approximately one minute. 
This time expenditure is certainly consistent with the requirement 
of cue theory that the cue be "readily identifiable." 
To test the hypothesis that such policy cues were being used by 
justices, all petitions for certiorari listed in U.S. Law Week for four 
years which dealt with economic policy were examined. It was 
expected that judges who were economic liberals would consider 
the policy cue to be present (i.e., they viewed the decision below 
to be incorrect from a policy perspective) if the losing party in the 
court below was a union or employee in a labor relations case; the 
national or state government in a case involving government regula- 
tion of the economy; the government in a corporate tax case or in 
an individual tax case involving estate tax, gift tax, or income on 
capital gains; or an injured worker in a suit to receive compensation 
for the injury. For an economic conservative, the policy cue was 
considered to be present if the court below supported the claims 
of the parties listed above (that is, the court below made a liberal 
decision) . 
Since the votes of individual justices on certiorari are not avail- 
able except for the time period studied by Ulmer, time periods had 
to be found in which courts could be classified as relatively liberal 
or conservative on economic policy.16 There have been two periods 
in this century in which the ideological make-up of the Court has 
been significantly altered within five years by a single president who 
was both determined to change the Court and who was fortunate 
enough to be able to make four or five appointments within that 
period. These two periods were Franklin Roosevelt's second term 
(1937-40) and Richard Nixon's first term (1969-72). 
The four years chosen for analysis were the years immediately 
before and after each of these two presidents had succeeded in re- 
shaping the Court majority: 1935, 1941, 1967, 1972. The Court in 
1935 and 1972 was classified as conservative on economic policy, 
16 For analysis of this data from Justice Burton's papers, see Ulmer, "Under- 
dogs and Upperdogs"; Ulmer, "Decision to Grant Certiorari"; Ulmer, et. al., 
"Further Considerations of Cue Theory"; and S. Sidney Ulmer, "Supreme Court 
Justices as Strict and Not So Strict Constructionists: Some Implications," 
Law and Society Review, 8 (Fall 1973), 13-32. 
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TABLE 1 
EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICY CUE FOR DECISIONS 
TO GRANT CERTIORARI IN ECONOMIC CASES: 
1935, 1941, 1967, 1972 COMBINED 
Policy Cue Certiorari Granted Certiorari Denied 
Present 114 184 
Absent 41 294 
N=633, x2=57.43, phi =.091, p<.OOl 
Percentage of Certiorari Petitions Granted 
Cue Present =38.3% 
Cue Absent =12.2% 
and in 1941 and 1967 was classified as liberal.'7 For the two liberal 
courts, the policy cue was considered to be present if the decision 
in the court below was conservative. For the two conservative 
courts, the policy cue was considered present if the decision below 
was liberal. 
The data used to test the proposition that policy cues were used 
by the justices in their screening of certiorari petitions is presented 
in Table 1. The data reveal that when the court below made a 
decision which the Supreme Court majority presumably would 
evaluate as in error from a policy perspective after a quick tentative 
evaluation, certiorari was granted 38.3 percent of the time. This 
figure is well within the theoretical expectations of Tanenhaus, 
et. al.'8 On the other hand, when the policy cue was not present, 
17 The change in the economic policy of the court from 1935 to 1941 is too 
well documented to require further explanation. For the classic work on the 
change, see C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial 
Politics and Values 1937-1947 (New York: Macmillan, 1948). The author's 
own tabulation, reported below, of the liberal and conservative decisions of the 
Supreme Court in economic cases decided with full opinions (all decisions with 
dissent and all unanimous reversals) in 1967 and 1972 supports the popular 




1972 11 8 
1967 20 2 
N,=41, x2=6.15, p<.02 
18 Tanenhaus, et. al., "Cue Theory,' 121. 
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TABLE 2 
EFFECr OF THE PRESENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT AS PARTY CUE FOR DECISIONS 
TO GRANT CERTIORARI IN ECONOMIC CASES: 
1935, 1941, 1967, 1972 COMBINED 
Policy Cue Certiorari Granted Certiorari Denied 
Present 64 35 
Absent 91 443 
N =633, x2= 102.42, phi=.161, p<.001 
Percentage of Certiorari Petitions Granted 
Cue Present= 64.6% 
Cue Absent = 17.0% 
certiorari was granted only 12.2 percent of the time. Since these 
differences are statistically significant at the .001 level of confidence, 
the hypothesis that policy cues are used by the justices initially 
appears to be confirmed. 
However, the possibility that the relationship demonstrated above 
was caused by the presence of some other cues must be explored. 
Tanenhaus, et. al., found that the party cue (the federal govern- 
ment seeking review) had the greatest effect on the decision to 
grant certiorari. Table 2 demonstrates that the presence of the 
party cue was also strongly related to the decision to grant certiorari 
in the four Court terms included in this analysis. Therefore the 
party cue was chosen as the appropriate control variable for the 
relationship displayed in Table 1.19 
Table 3 presents the relationship between presence of the policy 
cue and the decision to grant or deny certiorari controlled by the 
presence or absence of the party cue. It may be seen that the 
presence of the policy cue is statistically significantly related to the 
tendency to grant certiorari at the .001 level of confidence for both 
those cases in which the party cue is present and those in which 
the party cue is absent. These results support the initial hypothesis 
that policy cues are in fact used by the justices. 
Party and policy cues appear to have a reinforcing effect. When 
neither cue is present, the percentage of cases in which certiorari is 
19 of the other cues used by Tanenhaus, et. al., only the dissension cue is 
possibly present in the data used in this analysis. However, this cue was 
found to have much less effect on certiorari than either of the other cues. 
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TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICY CUE FOR DECISIONS TO GRANT 
CERTIORARI IN ECONOMIC CASES WHEN CONTROLLED 
FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE PARTY CUE 
(A) Party Cue Present 
Policy Cue Certiorari Granted Certiorari Denied 
Absent 12 27 
Present 52 8 
N=99, x2=32.24, phi=.326, p<.001 
Percentage of Certiorari Petitions Granted 
Policy Cue Present=86.7% 
Policy Cue Absent =30.8% 
(B) Party Cue Absent 
Policy Cue Certiorari Granted Certiorari Denied 
Absent 29 267 
Present 62 176 
N = 534, x2= 24.55, phi =.046, p<.001 
Percentage of Certiorari Petitions Granted 
Policy Cue Present = 26.1% 
Policy Cue Absent = 9.8% 
granted falls to 9.8 percent while, when both are present, it soars to 
the astounding acceptance rate of 86.7 percent. When only one of 
the cues is present the rate for granting certiorari assumed inter- 
mediate values. 
One additional possibility remains to be explored. Since by 
definition all economic cases in which the national government 
seeks review (that is, those in which the party cues are present) 
are conservative decisions of the courts below, the relative strength 
of the party and policy cues may be affected by a differential tend- 
ency of the Court in all time periods to grant review to liberal and 
conservative decisions below. 
To control for this possibility, the analysis of Table 3 was re- 
peated with the sample of cases restricted to those in which the 
courts below made a conservative decision. The results are dis- 
played in Table 4. 
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TABLE 4 
EFFECT OF THE POLICY CUE FOR DECISIONS TO GRANT CERTIORARI IN ECONOMIC 
CASES IN PETITIONS FROM CONSERVATIVE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW- 
CONTROLLED FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE PARTY CUE 
(A) Party Cue Present 
Policy Cue Certiorari Granted Certiorari Denied 
Absent 12 27 
Present 52 8 
N=99, x2=32.24, phi=.326, p<.001 
Percentage of Certiorari Petitions Granted 
Policy Cue Present=86.7% 
Policy Cue Absent =30.8% 
(B) Party Cue Absent 
Policy Cue Certiorari Granted Certiorari Denied 
Absent 2 42 
Present 23 13 
N = 80, x2=32.66, phi=.408, p<.001 
Percentage of Certiorari Petitions Granted 
Policy Cue Present=63.9% 
Policy Cue Absent = 4.5% 
When only conservative decisions of the courts below are con- 
sidered, the relationship between the presence of the policy cue and 
the decision to grant certiorari is very strong. When both the 
policy cue and the party cue are present, certiorari was granted in 
86.7 percent of the cases. Perhaps more surprising, when the party 
cue is absent but the policy cue present, certiorari was still granted 
in 63.9 percent of the cases (compared to only 30.8 percent of the 
cases in which only the party cue was present). When neither cue 
was present, the success rate for the petitioners dropped to 4.5 per- 
cent. 
The data presented above appear to be consistent with the cue 
theory of Supreme Court decision-making on certiorari petitions 
which was advanced by Tanenhaus and associates. They strongly 
suggest that in addition to the cues discovered by Tanenhaus, et. al., 
policy cues are used by the justices to determine which petitions 
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deserve careful scrutiny. In fact the evidence suggests that when 
dealing with cases containing economic issues, policy cues are at 
least as important as the most important of the three cues discovered 
by Tanenhaus, et. al. The strength of association between the 
presence of the policy cue and the certiorari decision (as measured 
by the phi coefficient) when controlled by the presence or absence 
of the party cue was greater than the strength of association be- 
tween the party cue and the certiorari decision when controlled by 
the policy cue.20 Although the differences between these measures 
of association are not large, they suggest that at least policy cues 
are of comparable importance to the party cue. 
20 The phi value for the relationship between the party cue and the certiorari 
decision was .256 when the policy cue was also present and .041 when the 
policy cue was absent. 
